

Applications Homework 00 (due Friday, April 28)

Directions: Write up carefully argued solutions to the following problems. Your solution should be clear enough that it should explain to someone who does not already understand the answer why it works. You may use results from lecture and previous homeworks without proof.

In this applications assignment, you will explore various ways that RSA can completely break if the keys aren't chosen carefully!

0. Message Size (20 points)

The first attack will be based on the *size of the message* being small. You may note that this attack is also dependent on e being small, but, in most RSA implementations e is usually chosen to be small on purpose. Your job is to decrypt `encrypted_message` given that it was encrypted using **K0**. To do this, you will want to take the e th root of the encrypted message. Consider using the two argument `pow` function in Python and rounding the output with `round`.

K0: `N = 2775709885706482673703609847403162795553305573741928110714322598212546
0644011305883560832121497315397135189973176627544089920825316535758662
0040574528350439770478644539445202891742064593577016139613696694852564
6374889482925286362857940819309100879536413427729952503475969916176216
4830167608665045842374063326114605306634033831903009439249232283316963
6979720034581837370762066460220071787616892866287275193029648409112642
1634157125817372352949142604110064136470705432583894178214639363501635
3550607318640978548384452185904400903188079534247131338435241316750644
507074805726851366426169406208730117954624324667689676753`

`e = 3`

`encrypted_message = 109599938775622399587345269212768768`

Note that to convert `num` (a number) to `m` (a string representing the message), you can use the following line in Python: `m = bytes([x for x in num.to_bytes(1000, byteorder='little') if x != 0])`.

- (a) [10 Points] Write and submit Python code that recovers the original message in English **and** also submit the actual decrypted message.
- (b) [10 Points] Write and submit an explanation of why the message has to be short for this attack to work.

1. Wiener's Attack (80 points)

The second attack will be significantly more sophisticated than the previous one (though, surprisingly not that much more code). Consider the following (weird) theorem:

Wiener's Theorem

Given an RSA key (N, e, d, p, q) with the following properties:

- $q < p < 2q$
- $d < \frac{N^{\frac{1}{4}}}{3}$

An attacker can efficiently recover the entire private key: (d, p, q) from just the public part: (N, e) .

While this theorem looks scary and arbitrary, you'll investigate it in two ways in this assignment. First, you'll finish a proof of the theorem. Then, you'll implement the attack on some insecure keys.

Before we can get into either the implementation or proof of the theorem, we need make a quick digression to the land of continued fractions! Continued fractions are a way of representing a real number as a sequence of integers. Given a number $x \in \mathbb{R}$, its continued fraction representation is of the form:

$$x = a_0 + \frac{1}{a_1 + \frac{1}{a_2 + \frac{1}{a_3 + \dots}}}$$

where $a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots$ are known as the *coefficients* of the continued fraction.

The *convergents* of a continued fraction are the best rational approximation of the number x which can be obtained by truncating the continued fraction. The n -th convergent is of the form:

$$\frac{h_n}{k_n} = a_0 + \frac{1}{a_1 + \frac{1}{a_2 + \frac{1}{\dots + \frac{1}{a_n}}}}$$

Now we are ready to start proving Wiener's theorem! First, note that $ed \equiv_{\phi(N)} 1$. So, there is a $k \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $ed - k\phi(N) = 1$. Dividing both sides by $d\phi(N)$, we get:

$$\frac{e}{\phi(N)} - \frac{k}{d} = \frac{1}{d\phi(N)}$$

A Theorem By Legendre

If $|a - \frac{b}{c}| < \frac{1}{2c^2}$ and $\gcd(b, c) = 1$, then b/c appears as some convergent of the continued fraction of a .

- (a) [10 Points] Use the above to prove that Legendre's theorem applies for $a = \frac{e}{\phi(N)}$ with $\frac{b}{c} = \frac{k}{d}$. That is, show

$$\gcd(k, d) = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \left| \frac{e}{\phi(N)} - \frac{k}{d} \right| = \frac{1}{d\phi(N)} < \frac{1}{2d^2}.$$

You'll need to use the givens, from above: $d < \frac{N^{\frac{1}{4}}}{3}$ and $q < p < 2q$.

Unfortunately, for us, $\phi(N)$ is still something we cannot compute. Instead, we'll try switching the denominator on the left to just plain N by showing the resulting difference is still within the threshold.

That is, we want to show:

$$\left| \frac{e}{N} - \frac{k}{d} \right| < \frac{1}{2d^2}$$

But first, a lemma!

Lemma 1. $|N - \phi(N)| < 3\sqrt{N}$.

(b) [10 Points] Prove Lemma 1 using the given that $q < p < 2q$.

Now, use the first lemma to prove another lemma!

Lemma 2. $\left| \frac{e}{N} - \frac{k}{d} \right| < \frac{3k}{d\sqrt{N}}$.

(c) [10 Points] Prove Lemma 2 using Lemma 1 and the proof of Wiener's Theorem [on Wikipedia](#). We believe the proof on there is so convoluted that it is a good usage of your time to try to understand it instead of duplicate it. Note that you must justify every step in this part (which Wikipedia does not do). You may not reference the proof on Wikipedia directly though.

And again, another lemma!

Lemma 3. $k < d$.

(d) [10 Points] Prove Lemma 3.

(e) [10 Points] Complete the proof of the new version of the claim by using Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. That is, show:

$$\left| \frac{e}{N} - \frac{k}{d} \right| < \frac{1}{2d^2}$$

Finally! Now that we've satisfied the constraints of Legendre's theorem above, we can apply it to find $\frac{k}{d}$ as a convergent of $\frac{e}{n}$.

Now, we can get to coding! You can now write a Python program to implement Wiener's Attack on some unsuspecting keys. This attack will have three pieces:

I. Find the coefficients of the continued fraction of e/N .

1. Initialize $r = e/N$. Sequentially take $i = \lfloor r \rfloor$, add i to your list of coefficients, and set $f = r - i$. If $f = 0$, stop. Otherwise, set $r = 1/f$ and repeat.
2. Use the `fractions` library in Python to wrap your r in a `Fraction` object - this will avoid compounding floating point errors and make your life much easier.

II. Find the convergents of the continued fraction of e/N .

1. Given a list of coefficients a_n for $n \geq 0$ (which you calculated in step I.), the convergents $\frac{h_n}{k_n}$ can be found according to the recurrences:

$$h_{-2} = k_{-1} = 0$$

$$k_{-2} = h_{-1} = 1$$

$$h_n = a_n h_{n-1} + h_{n-2}$$

$$k_n = a_n k_{n-1} + k_{n-2}$$

III. For each convergent $c = a/b$:

1. Calculate $\text{potential_phi} = (eb - 1)/a$. Use integer division (which is `//` in Python).
2. Solve this quadratic equation using the Python code below.

$$x^2 - (N - \text{potential_phi} + 1)x + N = 0$$

```
1 def solve(a, b, c):
2     from decimal import Decimal, getcontext
3     getcontext().prec = 1000
4     a = Decimal(a)
5     b = Decimal(b)
6     c = Decimal(c)
7     return (int((-b + (b**2 - 4*a*c).sqrt())/(2*a)), int((-b - (b**2 - 4*a*c).sqrt())/(2*a)))
```

3. Check if the two solutions to the quadratic equation multiply together to make N . If so, we found a factorization!

(f) [30 Points] For each of the three RSA keys below, recover p and q . You should submit the actual values as well as your Python code.

K1: $N = 90581$

$e = 17993$

K2: $N = 1327599385544782705790557531615292893380355971356103848695355695529552$
 $8774181862206805700546600906242564213981921365567995067466223388392052$
 $3455499163854640108988961862458566028351785784234404800665923764600071$
 $1273359964980769196822643351949626452954980869768799116381751066867762$
 $4950462967083150968059963277221081933239285021940877379067473095833217$
 $3836456725156352153882945661196808513029619022547193596480809570835563$
 $4740046281649704634417307816836168827085460709390259205853957073796135$
 $7033856659209349287236681426501482268591633258592399958227708167643570$
 $575052735251331518114924442746592771217694695504776276961$

$e = 6869454678986259943295672398532193670233196629741642654148482133761559$
 $1963906525585042771062213382688701299757720554618956684218561467630031$
 $0551686510418475520097270226500394372126574437409734435424145135351350$
 $1857878500145063148153328058395688185719694760622513640095297444895603$
 $1279830234286882069839601954548091097738205903547685623413058371084466$
 $0675709637272256599063035035258056132429807747785354614488875836317279$
 $5669876649383889558979157217188456756256190891713436963251646440807031$
 $6126918264253106051479057988714187015111852070580754712993481203973484$
 $2603015299505413097056641604844102873006636917657600017$

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K3: N = 8812043537783992834592375402234870396641825341735701299647176256406599
7329680517708968821609230038336072999648018850151254250723601136064813
9710988057569803880577166678963426806064048958935291877637033951269757
4115046707945166768935552152018424854018421507242016690189690266914976
9371706947812076282951446003219379614266454401718124335324868348241847
9004213375582443275235822165900630749458501399763956224105847817023488
4138716515700636502484016416273137975716040363780457577708511916105622
5368969778704810338946823495350702998940644191159753551005271137191558
75811681020802476667931645594671094318025099949648383347

e = 3228301342303266421169117315760265758438425860657333023075829597552395
2120177964369118842752879663904076178029387241783669421944662057284703
7204321660893945683995480478684517557221310812943679586038984510025856
6530684300969970499328655564039032662829299392356057113051321831341669
2574026510492441231954878718562589098243059768965849630160029940716192
3797664999697852829012478549822125235360847482104396890849982225289128
0270405656437751865360460356950820053427716165084853009640829990558003
6267076209868738737431366551802857237898014323229893926067842780598583
29547458885482252281296914966739731284337574001556313361